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latter, in bad vis-à-vis good times. The overall conclusion from our probit analyses
is that the way in which management and works councils interact, and hence the
way in which codetermination is implemented, makes all the difference to the firm’s
economic position. Our most compelling finding relates to the role of management:
a positive attitude of managers toward the works council is positively associated
with organizational performance, both in the private and the public sector. In the
private sector, this result is even reinforced in times of reorganization.
Keywords Works councils . Codetermination . Reorganization . Organizational
performance . Interaction .Managerial response
JEL classification J53
J Labor Res (2011) 32:136–156
DOI 10.1007/s12122-011-9105-x
A. van den Berg (*) : Y. Grift :A. van Witteloostuijn







A. van den Berg :A. van Witteloostuijn
Faculty of Applied Economics, University of Antwerp, Antwerp, Belgium
A. van Witteloostuijn
Department of Organisation and Strategy, Tilburg University, Tilburg, Netherlands
Introduction
The effect of works councils on organizational performance received ample attention
in the industrial relations literature. Empirical studies come up with mixed evidence,
however. For example, using (self-reported) profitability as the yardstick, most
studies report negative effects (e.g. Addison et al. 2001; Dilger 2002), while recently
Mueller (2010) establishes the opposite, which he attributes to his use of an objective
profit measure. A second example is the estimated impact of works councils on
employment, which is predominantly negative (e.g. Addison and Teixeira 2006), but
recently Jirjahn (2009) has demonstrated the reverse effect, which is attributed to the
use of a different methodology. Mixed results are found as well when using other
performance measures such as productivity, innovation, wages and labor turnover
(see the overview studies by Addison et al. 2004 and Addison 2009). This implies
that further work is needed to explore the underlying contingencies that can explain
the nature of the works council—organizational performance linkage. The reason for
further work on this relationship follows from a few biases that dominate the extant
literature.
First, by far the majority of all studies focus on Germany. One notable exception
is the recent article by Fairris and Askenazy (2010), who report on the impact of
French works councils on productivity. Our paper concentrates on another country
with a long-standing works council tradition: the Netherlands. Second, apart from a
few exceptions, most existing studies introduce rather course-grained measures of
works council-related independent variables, usually simply their mere absence or
presence. But the plain existence of a works council in a firm does not guarantee a
successful outcome. We argue, instead, that it is more revealing to analyze how
works council members and top managers interact, and consequently how this
interaction impacts company performance. By focusing on top managers’ and works
councils’ attitudes, we add more fine-grained measures of the perceived nature of
works council functioning. We find support for this approach in Bryson et al. (2006),
who conclude from a British sample that a constructivemanagerial response to (any kind
of) worker participation strongly improves productivity. Third, as a rule, existing
research only comprises organizations in the private sector, whereas works councils are
(often) also present in the public sector. Therefore, we explore a public sector sub-
sample, and compare the results carefully with those from the private sector analyses,
albeit with a few necessary adjustments to our model. Fourth, what we will ultimately
focus on is how codetermination affects the economic position of the organization
during an external shock that reflects bad times—i.e. in the form of a downsizing
reorganization. The rationale for this is that workers’ participation might work fine in
good times, but is really put to the test when an organization is restructured.
Our data are collected through a nation-wide and sector-wide survey administered
in 1998 among 656 Dutch organizations with a works council. The compilers of this
dataset have published their main findings with the aid of descriptive statistics only
(Looise and Drucker 2003; Van het Kaar and Looise 1999). Recently, the data have
been released for other researchers in order to perform multivariate regression
analysis. So far, this has resulted in one study, in which the perceived effects of
works councils on efficiency and innovation have been estimated in the Dutch
private and public sector (Van den Berg et al. 2009).
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The present study analyzes the effect of the attitude of Dutch works council
members and top managers toward each other on organizational performance. In so
doing, we do not focus so much on the effect of the mere presence of a works
council, as is done in the majority of earlier studies and as all the sampled
organization have installed a works council anyway, but rather on the impact of the
different ways in which a works council can be perceived to function in practice.
Specifically, we will verify what determinants are most decisive in explaining the
economic position of organizations. Through the questionnaire, respondents were
asked to rank the economic position of their establishment from weak to strong.
Empirically, we first test a comprehensive organizational performance model that
incorporates standard economic explanatory variables, particularly firm and
workforce characteristics. Subsequently, we include attitudinal variables of the
management teams and the works councils with respect to their internal dealings. In
the final round of analyses, we zoom in on the effect of the functioning of works
councils on the organization’s economic position when reorganization occurs by
adding interaction terms. So, our statistical analyses have a hierarchical set-up,
moving from baseline to main effects before adding interaction terms. In so doing,
we hope to unravel the subtle contingency-specific drivers of the impact of works
council functioning on organizational performance.
We will start with a brief sketch of the relevant theories in “Theory”, which
results in the formulation of a set of five testable conjectures, relating to four main
effects and one set of interaction effects. Next, the data and research method are
elaborated upon in “Methodology”. The main findings of our estimations will be
presented in “Evidence”. In the conclusion, we will further reflect upon our key
finding—that the way in which management teams and works councils treat each
other plays a very important role in determining the overall performance of
organizations, especially in times of reorganization.
Theory
Background
In the Netherlands, works councils are mandatory in each organization that employs
fifty or more workers. Dutch works councils have far-reaching legal rights (Bakels
2003; Looise and Drucker 2003). These concern the right to receive sufficient and
timely information, the right to give advice (on specified financial and business
matters) and the right to give consent (on social matters). In addition, they have the
possibility to call upon external expert advice, at the organization’s expense, and
they have the option to go to court if they believe that their rights are somehow
violated.
Theoretically, Freeman and Lazear (1995) show that each of these rights can be
used to the benefit of all stakeholders, leading to a win-win outcome. Firstly,
communication between the organization’s executive board members and workers’
representatives can enhance trust, because a works council is able to judge whether
the information from the management team is reliable. The works council is then
able to submit management’s decisions to the personnel in a credible way, which in
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turn may foster acceptance. This proves to be especially relevant in bad times by
preventing industrial unrest, and hence avoiding a decline in labor productivity.
Secondly, advisory rights may allow workers to come up with suggestions that have
an excess value. Consultation of the works council by management may help in
solving problems. And thirdly, codetermination rights give the employees more
control over their own working conditions and work security, which prompts them to
stay loyal to the firm in the longer run. In that way, the interests of workers and
shareholders will be better aligned.
As a counter-force, Freeman and Lazear (1995) also discuss the possibility that an
influential labor force will try to raise wages and maintain employment even if this
ultimately endangers the economic position of the firm. As for the Netherlands, the
risk of this kind of rent-seeking behavior by works councils is very much curtailed
by the law, which gives the prerogative of wage negotiations to the trade unions.
Moreover, works council members are legally obliged to fulfill a dual task: they
should protect the interests of the organization’s personnel, but not at all costs, since
they are also required to act in the interests of the firm at large (Bakels 2003).
However, works councils could have an adverse effect on the functioning of the
firm due to a possible lack of know-how and because they may slow down decision-
making processes if they think that this is to their own benefit. Kaufman and Levine
(2000) refer to these downsides as indirect costs of employee representation. As
direct costs they mention expenses in the form of lost working hours due to meetings
and schooling of the works council members, the costs of the facilities they use, and
disbursements related to the hiring of outside professional consultants. In the context
of the Dutch arrangement, we could add that very large costs will arise when works
councils exercise their right to go to court.
Influenced by Freeman and Medoff (1984), Bryson et al. (2006) point to the
importance of managerial responses to any form of worker voice. They argue that
the functioning of this ‘voice mechanism’ depends on the attitude of management
toward worker participation, and that consequently the performance of the firm
greatly depends on the degree in which management is inclined to give
(representatives of) employees a say in company policies. In their empirical analysis
with respect to private sector companies in the United Kingdom, they differentiate
between managerial attitude toward union representatives and non-union represen-
tatives (such as consultative committees, which can be regarded as voluntary works
councils), respectively. They find that only in non-union workplaces there is indeed
a significant positive effect from a sympathetic managerial attitude toward employee
representatives on labor productivity.
Testable Conjectures
From the above, we infer that the presence of codetermination is an important but
not a sufficient condition to enhance an organization’s performance, in whatever way
this is measured. It ultimately depends on the degree in which workers’
representatives are taken seriously by their management and, in turn, on the degree
in which workers are willing and able to cooperate with management to overcome
problems. Only then, a fruitful collaboration may contribute to the economic
position or development of the organization. From the outset, however, it is hard to
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formulate very precise hypotheses, especially if these should hold both in the private
sector and in the public sector. As a recent study (Van den Berg et al. 2009) argues
and shows, the mutual relations between management teams and works councils
significantly differs when comparing the private with the public sector, which leads
to different perceived effects of works councils on efficiency and innovation in these
two sub-sectors of the economy. So our strategy in this paper will be to formulate a
series of assumed benchmark relationships, referred to as conjectures, of which the
effect on the economic position of an organization is not always clear-cut, but which
can be tested empirically.
First, the more management is inclined to adopt an open, sympathetic attitude
toward the works council, the more the latter is willing to communicate, to give
advice and to collaborate. Second, the more timely the management team involves
the works council in organizational decision-making, the more the latter will feel
entrusted. Hence, this will increase the works council’s willingness to collaborate
constructively. Third, the more the works council is inclined to adopt an open,
considerate attitude toward the management team, the more fruitful their consultation
meetings will be. Finally, if the works council is not inclined to slacken the speed of
decision-making for its own sake, this will positively affect mutual understanding,
which will have a favorable impact on the organization’s economic position.
Still, the impact of the works council on the economic position of the
organization is not unconditionally negative or positive, but depends on the
circumstances. In the current study, we focus on bad versus good times.
Specifically, we will explore the connection between the effects of codetermi-
nation and the economic position of the organization in case of ‘bad weather’, as
reflected in downsizing or reorganization programs. On its own accord, the
relationship between downsizing—or reorganization, more broadly—and firm
performance is most often found to be negative for a variety of economic,
psychological and sociological reasons (Sorge and van Witteloostuijn 2004).
Moreover, downsizing studies revealed that the performance impact of downsizing
can be expected to be even more negative if the reorganization coincides with
compulsory redundancies and forced layoffs (Cascio and Wynn 2004).
Specifically, we are interested in the issue as to what participation rights are worth
when the organization experiences such difficulties, and needs to reorganize. In other
words, what will happen with codetermination effects on economic performance in
bad times, when the organization has to restructure? Cascio and Wynn (2004) argue
that downsizing needs to be accompanied by worker participation, in order to
manage a reorganization process effectively. If employees are not involved in this
process, passiveness and discouragement will dominate, making the organization
worse off. They refer to four conditions for successful employee participation.
These are timely involvement, a knowledgeable workforce, consultation about
issues that really matter to the workers, and a company’s culture that is favorable
to employee input. If these conditions hold, workers will stay committed, and
will be motivated to dedicate themselves to reviving their firm. This logic leads
to the following conjectured set of interaction effects: if the organization is going
through a reorganization program, the positive effect of a well-functioning management
team—works council relationship (as conjectured above) on the firm’s economic
position will be reinforced.
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Methodology
In 1998, a survey was conducted nation-wide among Dutch private and public sector
organizations that operated with a works council. In that year approximately 13,500
organizations employing over fifty employees were estimated to actually have a
works council, of which slightly over 30% could be found in the public sector. On
average, around the turn of the century councils had actually been set up in about
73% of all 50+ organizations, but that percentage concealed some remarkable
differences, both between private and public sector and between large and small
establishments. While the public sector accounted for a density rate of about 96%,
the private sector covered about 61% of all eligible firms. In addition, whereas
around 94% of the large organizations (200+) had a works council, the small ones
(between 50 and 100) only made up 58% (Engelen et al. 2001).
A long list of questions was sent to both management teams (board of directors)
and works councils of 3,500 randomly chosen firms with a works council, of whom
731 (21%) responded; 475 directors (14%) and 407 works councils (12%),
respectively. For the analyses in this paper, we use the directors’ survey for two
reasons. First, only the directors have been asked to give an indication of the
organizational performance of their establishments. Second, the sub-sample with two
completed questionnaires, by representatives from the management team and the
works council of the same organization, is too small for the type of econometric
analyses we wish to apply here.
Due to the survey’s sampling design, organizations with more than 200
employees are overrepresented compared to the national population, and so are
public sector organizations. The latter can probably be attributed to a then recent
change in the law, stipulating that 50-plus public sector establishments had to install
a works council (Van het Kaar and Looise 1999). Looking in more detail at the
representativeness by industrial sector, comparing official statistics (CBS 1998) with
our sample, we find that both for manufacturing and the public sector the
percentages in the sample are in line with the actual population of Dutch
organizations with more than 50 employees. Construction and banking & insurance
are underrepresented, whereas transport & catering and public health & welfare are
overrepresented. Overall, the sample based on the director’s survey represents the
Dutch organizations with a works council reasonably well. The final dataset consists
of 183 private firms and 168 public organizations for which all relevant information
is available. Contrary to the various analyses for Germany, our dataset consists of
organizations in which a works council is always present. However, compared to
most German analyses, we have more detailed information on the way in which the
management teams and the works councils interact.
Dependent Variable: Economic Position of the Organization
The question about the organization’s economic position has three possible answer
categories: healthy/strong, somewhat worrisome, and worrisome/weak. Based on the
distribution over the three categories, we decided to combine the latter two
categories. For private firms, 85% of the managers reported that the firm had a
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healthy/strong economic position. Van het Kaar and Looise (1999: 40) state that in
the public sector this classification is more difficult to apply because here economic
position often does not have a clear meaning. Although this is probably true for the
public administration part of the public sector, this does not necessarily hold for
other parts of the public sector such as in education, public health and welfare, where
economic position can be interpreted in a meaningful way. Indeed, respondents in
these latter parts of the public sector make up for two thirds of the total number of
public sector observations. And indeed, they did answer the economic position
question. Over a prolonged period of time, the organizations in these segments of the
Dutch public sector have been confronted with a cutback in expenditures by the
government, which probably explains why only 65% reported a healthy economic
position.
Control Variables: Economic Measures
Following the existing literature on the effect of works councils on firm
performance, our baseline model explaining the economic position of organizations
includes characteristics concerning industry, firm, workforce, and personnel policy.
The model with respect to private sector establishments contains all of the variables
we will introduce below, while the model with respect to the public sector
deliberately omits the ones that are not appropriate because of lack of applicability in
the specific context of public sector organizations, as we will explain below.
First, the industry and firm characteristics refer to the main industrial sectors and
the size of the establishment (six categories, ranging from below 50 workers to over
1,000 workers). From the latter, we can deduct that the average size in both the
private sector and the public sector amounts to 3.25–3.45, implying about 125–145
workers per establishment. Further, this category contains two more variables:
whether or not the (private) firm has international collaborations (strategic alliances,
mergers or acquisitions), and whether or not the (private) firm has a parent company
(i.e., is legally dependent or not). Second, the workforce features comprise of factual
information concerning the percentage employed with tenure, the percentage of
unskilled labor, and the experience of the works council (measured on a three-point
scale: an incipient, a fairly experienced or a professional council).1 It can be seen for
all these three characteristics that there is hardly any difference in the personnel
composition between the private and the public sector: between 86% and 87% has a
tenured job, 21%–24% has unskilled work and 57%–60% of all works councils are
considered to be reasonably experienced. Third, for the personnel policy character-
istics, we use information about human resource management (HRM), and financial
participation schemes for higher staff (in the private sector only). A total of twelve
measures of HRM (each on a three-point scale: has been given hardly any, some, or
much attention) were distinguished, running from performance interviews and team
1 This variable is deliberately included under workforce features and not under codetermination
characteristics, because the latter category contains only attitudinal variables, which does not refer to
works council experience as an objective measure.
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building to training possibilities and career prospects. The dominant factor’s sum
score is, on average, about 27 in both the private and the public sector sub-sample,
indicating that most organizations pay at least some attention to different HRM
practices. The financial participation items relate to four different types of financial
reward instruments (profit sharing, options, shares, and bonds). Here, again, we
constructed composite measures by summing up the individual item scores, which
resulted in an average score of 1.1, indicating that most private firms offer only one
out of the four financial reward alternatives.
Independent Variables: Codetermination Measures
We distinguish four different aspects in connection with codetermination: both
the management teams’ and works councils’ attitude toward each other, whether
or not works councils exercise control by being timely involved in organizational
decision-making, and whether or not works councils slow down the decision-
making process.
The managers’ evaluation of their own attitude is classified as either being
prepared to accept compromises or search for new ways to find solutions, on the
one hand, or as formal and following rules or emphasizing an uneven balance of
power, on the other hand. The managers’ perception of the attitude of the works
council is classified in the same way. The phase in which the works council gets
involved in the organization’s decision-making processes is measured on a three-
point scale: the council monitors only the implementation of policies decided
upon by management, the council has a say in the last phase of decision-making
processes, or the council is involved in decision-making processes right from the
start. The slackening effect of works councils is incorporated through a binary
dummy: does the manager perceive the works council as slowing down decision-
making processes or not?
Although the sub-sample for which two completed questionnaires per establish-
ment are available is too small to be analyzed statistically, a quick look at the
differences between the managers’ and the works council’s evaluation of each
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Because part of our study’s focus is on the impact of codetermination in bad
times, in the baseline analyses we distinguish between past reorganizations with
and without involuntary layoffs. The relation between economic performance and
reorganization is complex. Since the information on reorganization stems from 1 to
2 years before the questionnaire was held, the causality runs from reorganization to
performance (see also “Estimation Strategy” about reverse causality). That means
that the expected negative impact of a reorganization on the economic performance
will prevail; the economic position after the reorganization will not have changed
that quickly. In the third step of our estimations, for the sake of parsimony, we only
take into account whether or not there has been any kind of reorganization. When
comparing the private sector with the public sector sub-sample, it catches the eye
that, on average, the latter have been hit more often by an overall reorganization
(in no less than 52% of all cases), but that the former more often had to deal
with forced lay-offs (in 18% of all cases). In all likelihood, this last finding can
be attributed to the fact that public sector workers are more difficult to dismiss.
other’s attitude reveals the following. Both managers and works councils evaluate
each other’s attitude in the same way in almost 80% of the cases in this small sub-
sample. If they diverge, the works council classifies its own attitude as more open-
minded than the managers do, while the classification of the managers is exactly the
other way around. So, the subjective information of managers on both their own
attitude and the attitude of works councils seems to be in line with the classification
by works councils.
Analyzing the effect of codetermination in times of reorganization is done by
including interaction terms, which are generated by multiplying the undifferentiated
reorganization variable by the four respective codetermination variables. Because the
reorganization referred to in the questionnaire has occurred in the past 2 years, which
is not that long ago, the interaction effect can still capture the impact of codetermination
on the economic position in bad times. Interpreting the results is now somewhat more
complicated. With product terms included, the effect of one of the codetermination
variables on the economic position is a combination of both the main effect of this
particular variable and the effect of the interaction variable on the organization’s
economic position. This will be clarified when we discuss the estimation results in the
next section. In Table 1, the descriptives are presented.
Estimation Strategy
Due to the design of the survey, almost all measures reflect perceptual data from
individual respondents. A first potential problem using this dataset therefore may be
common-method variance, which can be examined by applying Harman’s single-
factor test (see Podsakoff et al. 2003). For the private firms in our data, the test on
economic position and its explanatory variables reveals four to five factors with an
Eigenvalue greater than 1, and no single factor explaining most of the variance. A
factor analysis for the public sector shows a slightly different pattern. Although for
the most extensive analysis also five factors with an Eigenvalue larger than 1
emerge, for the basic analyses just three factors are found. Therefore, we conclude
that common-method variance does not seem a potential problem, for neither the
private nor the public sector. Comparing the more limited model specifications with
the extended ones, the literature clearly reveals that the likelihood of a common-
method bias sharply declines if non-linear and interaction terms are included in the
model (Chang et al. 2010). We will only report noteworthy results for the public
sector from the comprehensive analyses. Given the perhaps problematic interpreta-
tion of the economic position for the public sector, though, the results should still be
interpreted with caution.
A second problem might be multicollinearity. We therefore calculated the
variance inflation factors (VIF) for the extensive model to check whether introducing
interaction terms leads to problematic multicollinearity (see O’Brien 2007). For both
the private and public sector, it turned out that two of the four interaction terms have
a VIF higher than 10. One remedy is to measure both the main and interaction
variable differently by using mean-centering—i.e., with the main variable as it is and
the interaction variable in deviations from the mean(s). Then, the VIF scores all are
below 4, implying that multicollinearity is removed, as can be expected. As the
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Table 1 Descriptives: Private (n=183) and public sector establishments (n=168)
Private sector variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max χ2
Economic position (1=healthy/strong) 0.85 0 1
Industry and firm characteristics
Industry:
- Manufacturing 0.42 0 1 χ2 (1)=0.26 Pr=0.61
- Construction and housing 0.13 0 1 χ2 (1)=0.89 Pr=0.35
- Transport, trade, services, hotels & catering 0.33 0 1 χ2 (1)=1.35 Pr=0.25
- Banking and insurance 0.12 0 1 χ2 (1)=2.23 Pr=0.14
Establishment size: 3.25 1.48 1 6 χ2 (5)=1.78 Pr=0.88
1: 0–50 employees (in %) 9.69
2: 50–100 employees (in %) 27.87
3: 100–200 employees (in %) 22.95
4: 200–500 employees (in %) 19.67
5: 500–1,000 employees (in %) 8.74
6: more than 1,000 employees (in %) 11.48
International collaboration 0.41 0 1 χ2 (1)=3.49 Pr=0.06
Parent company 0.56 0 1 χ2 (1)=4.97 Pr=0.03
Workforce characteristics
Tenured personnel (in %) 87.41 8.59 60 100
Unskilled personnel (in %) 23.96 24.82 0 90
Experience of the works council: 1.86 0.62 1 3 χ2 (2)=6.55 Pr=0.04
1: starting (in %) 26.78
2: experienced (in %) 60.11
3: professional (in %) 13.12
Personnel policy characteristics
HRM practices combined (sum) 27.40 3.76 12 34 χ2 (16)=29.46 Pr=0.02
Financial participation schemes for
higher personnel (sum)
1.10 1.26 0 4 χ2 (4)=5.46 Pr=0.24
Downsizing
Reorganization overall 0.42 0 1 χ2 (1)=11.69 Pr=0.00
Reorganization without forced lay-offs 0.25 0 1
Reorganization with forced lay-offs 0.18 0 1
Codetermination characteristics
Manager’s attitude 0.93 0 1 χ2 (1)=10.28 Pr=0.00
Timing of involvement works council 2.06 0.83 1 3 χ2 (1)=5.80 Pr=0.06
Works council’s attitude 0.73 0 1 χ2 (1)=18.56 Pr=0.00
Non-delaying works council 0.57 0 1 χ2 (1)=0.63 Pr=0.43
Public sector variables
Economic position (1 = healthy/strong) 0.65 0 1
Industry and firm characteristics
Industry:
- Public health sector and welfare 0.67 0 1 χ2 (1)=0.05 Pr=0.82
- Public administration and other non-profit 0.33 0 1 χ2 (1)=0.05 Pr=0.82
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pattern of results (i.e., the sign of the interaction effects) is not affected by mean-
centering, we have incorporated the results without using this VIF-reducing method,
for the sake of ease of interpretation.2
Three final issues remain. One, we have checked whether or not the
relatively high mean value of the dependent variable causes any identification
problems. This could be the case if a particular combination of the explanatory
variables explains a large proportion of either the success or the failure option
of the dependent variable. It turned out that this was not the case. Two, in
2 After mean-centering, the coefficients of the main effects in the extensive model cannot be compared
directly with the coefficients in the codetermination model. The coefficient of the main effect in the
extended model including the VIF-reducing method is equal to the coefficient in the codetermination
model plus the coefficient for the interaction term (in deviations from the mean(s)) times the mean.
Moreover, in the extended model the effect of a change in the main effect on the economic position is
equal to the coefficient of the main effect plus the coefficient for the interaction term times the interaction
effect in deviations from the mean.
Establishment size: 3.46 1.40 1 6 χ2 (5)=4.91 Pr=0.43
1: 0–50 employees (in %) 4.76
2: 50–100 employees (in %) 25.60
3: 100–200 employees (in %) 22.62
4: 200–500 employees (in %) 23.81
5: 500–1,000 employees (in %) 12.50
6: more than 1,000 employees (in %) 10.71
Workforce characteristics
Tenured personnel (in %) 86.06 13.36 0 100
Unskilled personnel (in %) 20.59 20.94 0 90
Experience of the works council: 1.76 0.61 1 3 χ2 (1)=2.31 Pr=0.32
1: starting (in %) 33.33
2: experienced (in %) 57.14
3: professional (in %) 9.52
Personnel policy characteristics
HRM practices combined (sum) 26.70 3.07 17 35 χ2 (18)=15.90 Pr=0.60
Downsizing
Reorganization overall 0.52 0 1 χ2 (1)=0.09 Pr=0.77
Reorganization without forced lay-offs 0.45 0 1
Reorganization with forced lay-offs 0.07 0 1
Codetermination characteristics
Manager’s attitude 0.89 0 1 χ2 (1)=5.98 Pr=0.01
Timing of involvement works council 2.48 0.71 1 3 χ2 (1)=3.40 Pr=0.18
Works council’s attitude 0.71 0 1 χ2 (1)=0.59 Pr=0.44
Non-delaying works council 0.40 0 1 χ2 (1)=2.24 Pr=0.14
Table 1 (continued)
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principle, we acknowledge that estimating a simultaneous model explaining the
organization’s economic position and codetermination characteristics in con-
junction would perhaps have been more appropriate. However, we were unable
to find specifications of both equations with adequate instruments in a 2SLS
system, leaving the identification issue unsolved. Three, causality may run the
other way around, from economic position to reorganization: underperforming
organizations may be more likely to engage in reorganization programs.
However, in our survey, the economic position item relates to 1998, and the
reorganization questions to 1996–1997. Hence, reversed causality is not an
issue.
Given the classification of the economic position as a dummy, probit analysis is
the appropriate econometric method. The drawback of applying such a limited
dependent variable analysis, however, is that the size of the estimated coefficients
cannot be interpreted straightforwardly. Then, it is common practice to report the
marginal effects instead, despite the drawback of the difficulty of calculation and
interpretation of the marginal effects when combining main and interaction
terms.
Before turning to the findings from the multivariate analyses, some revealing
bivariate results are presented with regard to the private sector in Table 2 below. Due
to the small size of the dataset, extra attention needs to be paid to the distribution of
the variables used. Looking at one of the main codetermination variables—the
managers’ attitude toward the works council—the bivariate analyses reveal that the
distribution of the managers’ attitude measure does differ by the organization’s
economic position (χ2(1)=10.28, with p-value=0.001). This indicates that we can
expect a positive influence of managers’ attitude on the organization’s economic
position, ceteris paribus.
Additionally, the χ2 statistic (and its p-value) for the respective cross table of
the economic position dummy and all the independent variables are given in the
last column of Table 1. These statistics indicate that there is a base for the
analyses in the next section despite the relatively small numbers.
Table 2 Correlation between economic position and manager’s attitude in the private sector




Formal (=0) 6 7 13
21.43% 4.52% 7.10%
Open-minded (=1) 22 148 170
78.57% 95.48% 92.90%
Total 28 155 183
100% 100% 100%
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Evidence
The Private Sector
Table 3 shows the results for the different specifications regarding the private
sector sub-sample. Our aim is to show that the explanation of the economic
position of a firm cannot just be found in purely economic determinants, but is also
influenced by the specific way in which codetermination has been designed and is
perceived. Hence, we start with a baseline model that includes only economic
control variables, the results of which we discuss only briefly. Subsequently, we add
our codetermination measures, enabling us to test our first four main-effect
conjectures. In the last step of the analysis, we test whether or not (and if so, to
what degree) the effects of these codetermination variables are different in bad
(reorganization) versus good times.
The Baseline Model
In Column 1 of Table 3, the results of the baseline model are presented, explaining
the economic position by means of industry, firm and workforce characteristics, as
well as personnel policy features.3 It firstly shows that internationally oriented
enterprises perform better, while subsidiaries perform less well. Secondly, both
personnel holding permanent jobs and unskilled workers contribute positively to the
economic position of their firm. The former result is usually explained by pointing at
the supposedly higher commitment to the organization by tenured workers, but the
latter result comes somewhat as a surprise. An interpretation may be that an
unskilled labor force is associated with low cost—and hence higher profit, ceteris
paribus. Thirdly, we see that introducing HRM policies and financial incentives does
pay off, whereas reorganizing has a negative influence on the economic position.
However, there is a clear distinction between reorganization with and without
compulsory downsizing. In the former case, the adverse effect on the economic
position is much stronger. We find no effect of experienced versus less and non-
experienced works councils.
The Codetermination Model with Main Effects Only
In Column 2 of Table 3, the codetermination characteristics are added. In addition to
the baseline model, we now also find that larger enterprises report a better economic
position. Moreover, on top of the positive effect of having a higher percentage of
tenured and unskilled personnel, the more experienced a works council is, the more
this weakens the firm’s economic position. This might indicate that, in practice, these
works council members do not exert their experience to the benefit of the firm, but
instead tend to get bogged down in counterproductive group behavior that obstructs
3 Compared to the usual independent variables in the literature, we have excluded a measure of collective
bargaining agreements. In initial analyses, we added such a measure, but it did not turn significant in any
of our analyses, nor did it affect the pattern of results in any way.
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Table 3 Marginal effects explaining the healthy economic position for the private sector
Variable (1) (2) (3)
Marginal effects (t-value)b
Industry and firm characteristics
Industry dummiesa Included Included Included
Establishment sizea Included Included* Included*
International collaboration 0.083** 0.023** 0.014**
(2.04) (2.20) (2.31)
Parent company −0.084** −0.023** −0.016***
(2.07) (2.13) (2.86)
Workforce characteristics
Tenured personnel (in %) 0.005** 0.002*** 0.001***
(2.16) (2.68) (2.62)
Unskilled personnel (in %) 0.002* 0.0004** 0.0002**
(1.82) (1.98) (2.01)
Experience of the works council 0.024 −0.019** −0.008*
(0.80) (2.25) (1.95)
Personnel policy characteristics
HRM practices combined (sum) 0.012** 0.002* 0.001*
(2.33) (1.73) (1.86)





Reorganization without forced lay-offs −0.138* −0.043
(1.91) (1.62)





Manager’s attitude 0.168** 0.272**
(2.00) (2.02)
Reorganization x manager’s attitude −0.003
(0.18)
Timing of involvement works council 0.019*** 0.008*
(2.74) (1.86)
Reorganization x timing involvement 0.002
(0.41)
Works council’s attitude 0.169*** 0.383***
(3.32) (3.20)
Reorganization x council’s attitude −0.166**
(2.41)
Non-delaying works council −0.008 −0.018*
(0.90) (1.90)
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rather than stimulates constructive consultation.4 This relates to group selection
and sorting theories that emphasize that (clusters within) organizations evolve
toward increasing group composition homogeneity because group members are
inclined to stay in those (entities within) organizations that suit their attitudes,
beliefs, personalities and preferences (e.g. Boone et al. 2004). Being part of a
congenial group reinforces people to be convinced of being right, hence sticking to
their point of view. High group-level tenure is associated with groupthink and
inertia.
A second observation is that we may conclude that the way in which
codetermination is implemented does matter indeed. Overall, codetermination
seems to have a positive effect on the economic position of Dutch private
enterprises. First, we find a positive relationship between the open-mindedness of
management and economic position. If the board of executive directors’ attitude
toward worker participation is favorable, this is likely to increase the quality of
consultation, so indirectly improving firm performance. Second, if the works
council is involved in the firm’s decision-making processes in an early phase,
this tends to enhance trust, enabling the works council to provide a valuable
contribution to company policies that translate into a better economic position.5
Third, a strong positive effect stems from a works council that adopts a constructive
stance toward the executive team. This positive attitude probably reflects that the
Table 3 (continued)
Variable (1) (2) (3)
Marginal effects (t-value)b
Reorganization x non-delaying council 0.008*
(1.92)
Observations 183 183 183
Mean value of the dependent variable 0.85 0.85 0.85
LR 57.80 89.63 93.70
P-value(LR) 0.000 0.000 0.000
Pseudod R2 0.369 0.572 0.598
a The complete (probit) estimation results are available upon request
b *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0.1
c The main and interaction effects of reorganization are jointly significant as are the pairs of the main and
interaction effects of the four codetermination characteristics (with the exception of the non-delaying
characteristic): manager’s attitude (χ2 (2)=6.79; p-value=0.034), timing of involvement (χ2 (2)=4.01;
p-value=0.134), works council’s attitude (χ2 (2)=10.27; p-value=0.006), and non-delaying works
council (χ2 (2)=9.54; p-value=0.009)
d The pseudo R2 cannot be interpreted as the adjusted R2 . A higher value indicates a better fit
4 This finding suggests that an experienced works council might normally be non-delaying and
cooperative, but once these two attitudinal traits have been controlled for explicitly, the effect of an
experienced works council turns negative for reasons put forward in the main text above.
5 The results do not change if instead of a three-valued variable (only involved when discussing the effects
for the personnel, involved in the last stage of the decision-making process, or involved in all stages of the
decision making process), two separate dummy variable were taken into account.
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work floor supports their representatives to communicate and cooperate with the
management team on company matters, making the firm better off.
A third observation relates to an unexpected result. The assumed positive effect of
a works council that does not use delaying tactics turns out to be negative and
insignificant. We return to this issue below, as the findings change after adjusting the
model in order to distinguish between bad vis-à-vis good times.
The Extensive Codetermination Model with Interaction Terms
Finally, Column 3 of Table 3 reveals mixed effects of codetermination in times of
reorganization. We infer this from the results for the interaction terms of the
codetermination characteristics with the overall reorganization dummy. As an aside,
we notice that by incorporating these interaction variables the impact of none of the
characteristics included in the baseline model on the economic position changes.
Moreover, this proves the robustness of the results stemming from the baseline and
codetermination models. Next, the effect of reorganization on the economic position
does not change either (χ2 (5)=14.47, with a p-value of 0.013). The combined effect
of a reorganization when (a) both the managers’ and works councils’ attitudes are
open-minded, (b) the works council’s involvement is timely and (c) the works
council does not delay remains significantly negative. The main effect of (each of
the four characteristics of) codetermination now reveals the impact in good times,
ceteris paribus, and the interaction effect shows the change in this main effect in bad
times.6 Looking at the signs of both the main and interaction effects, we observe that
in two out of four characteristics, the effect of codetermination on economic position
changes in times of downsizing.
The positive effect of an open-minded management on the economic position is
not reinforced in times of reorganization. Although both the main and the interaction
effect are jointly significant, and the interaction effect has the opposite sign, the size
of the interaction effect is rather small compared to the main effect. The main and
the interaction effect for the timing variable are not jointly significant. So the
positive effect of a timely involved works council is not reinforced in times of
reorganization. Contrary to the positive influence of an open-minded works council
during good times, this unexpectedly seems to have a less positive impact on
economic position during periods of reorganization; the main and the interaction
effect are jointly significant. Apparently, it is essential that in bad times a works
council pays more attention to the formal settlement of reorganization than to just
being a pleasant discussion partner of the management team. The fourth characteristic
of codetermination, a works council’s tendency to slow down decision-making
processes, shows a mixed pattern. The main effect now becomes significantly
negative, but in bad times a non-delaying works council significantly attenuates this
negative impact on economic position. So it seems that it does make a difference at
what moment a works council slows down decision-making processes. Hence,
contrary to what we assumed, not delaying the decision-making processes in good
6 For reasons of parsimony, we here take reorganizations with and without forced lay-offs together.
Otherwise, we would have ended up with eight instead of four interaction terms. We have established from
estimations not shown here that doing so does not change the main findings.
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times turns out to be harmful for firm performance. This indicates that a works council
sometimes delays the decision-making process not out of selfish considerations, but
because it wants to follow a more careful procedure for the benefit of the organization.
In bad times, however, management wants to act more quickly. Then, the slackening
approach of the works council hampers the speed of decision-making, which
negatively affects the organization’s economic position.
Interpreting the findings of the extensive codetermination model in good and bad
times in more detail, it shows that the probability of having a positive economic
position increases with 27%, ceteris paribus, if the management is open-minded and
increases with 0.8%, ceteris paribus, if the works council is informed in time
regardless of a reorganization. The probability of having a positive economic
position increases with 38% if the works council cooperates with the management
team in good times, but this probability decreases with 17% in bad times. With
respect to slowing down the decision-making process, in good times the probability
of having a positive economic position decreases with 1.8%, whereas in bad times
this probability increases with 0.8%. So, the impact of codetermination on the
economic position, in both good and bad times, can be quite large.
Overlooking the pattern of findings across all three private sector models, we
reach the following conclusion. The baseline model provides evidence for the
expected relationships between economic characteristics and economic position.
From the codetermination model, we can infer that the way codetermination is
implemented has a significant and positive effect on economic performance.
Extending the codetermination model to estimate whether worker participation
improves or deteriorates the firm’s economic position during times of reorganization,
we find a remarkable result. On the one hand, if management is willing to take
workers’ representatives seriously, captured by managers’ positive attitude and early
timing of involvement, the contribution of codetermination to firm performance does
not change in times of downsizing. On the other hand, if workers are willing to
cooperate constructively with management, captured by the works council’s positive
attitude, this surprisingly contributes negatively to firm performance in times of
downsizing. Moreover, contrary to our expectations, we find that a non-delaying
works council is damaging for the organization during good times.
The Public Sector
In Table 4, the relevant results are presented for both the private and the public sector
sub-samples, by way of comparison, with respect to the influence of codetermination
on the organization’s economic position. As indicated in “Dependent Variable:
Economic Position of the Organization”, due to the possible reading of the questions
answered by managers in specifically the public administration sub-sector, the results
for the public sector have to be interpreted with some care. Nevertheless, the findings
reveal a striking difference between both sectors with respect to the influence of
codetermination practices, which represents a puzzle that may inspire further work in
the future. Below, we will briefly discuss both codetermination models without and
with interaction terms.
We confine ourselves to describing the impact of codetermination on the
organization’s economic position, to examine the differences between the private
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and the public sector. We did run a baseline economic model first with only those
variables that are applicable to the public sector. So, we left out ‘International
collaboration’, ‘Parent company’ and ‘Profit sharing’, since these all relate
exclusively to private sector establishments. All managers, whether in the private
Table 4 Comparison of the explanation of the healthy economic position in the private and public sector:
marginal effects with respect to codetermination effects
Variable Privatea Privatea Publicc Publicc
Marginal effect (t-value)b
Control variablesc,d Included Included Included Included






Reorganization overall −0.047 −0.271
(0.87) (−0.742)
Codetermination characteristicse
Manager’s attitude 0.168** 0.272** 0.371** 0.337*
(2.00) (2.02) (2.54) (1.83)
Reorganization x manager’s attitude −0.003 0.001
(0.18) (0.00)
Timing of involvement works council 0.019*** 0.008* −0.159*** −0.157*
(2.74) (1.86) (2.68) (1.92)
Reorganization x timing involvement 0.002 0.022
(0.41) (0.18)
Works council’s attitude 0.169*** 0.383*** −0.019 −0.082
(3.32) (3.20) (0.20) (0.66)
Reorganization x council’s attitude −0.166** 0.137
(2.41) (0.75)
Non-delaying works council −0.008 −0.018* 0.145* −0.016
(0.90) (1.90) (1.74) (0.13)
Reorganization x non-delaying council 0.008* 0.287**
(1.92) (2.08)
Observations 183 183 168 168
Mean value of the dependent variable 0.85 0.85 0.65 0.65
a Column 2 and 3 from Table 3
b *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0.1
c The complete probit estimation results are available upon request
d The control variables included were: industry, establishment size, tenured personnel, unskilled personnel,
experience of the works council, and HRM practices
e See for joint significance for the private sector Table 3. For the public sector, the main and interaction
effects of reorganization are not jointly significant, whereas the pairs of the main and interaction effect of
the four codetermination characteristics are (with the exception of the works council’s attitude)
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or public sector, were asked to fill in exactly the same questionnaire. Of course, the
public sector managers left open questions referring to issues such as ‘parent
company’ or ‘international collaboration’. From the data, we inferred that of the 168
public sector respondents, no less than 163 indicated that they do not provide profit
sharing. The estimation gives just one significant coefficient: the percentage of
unskilled labor has a significantly negative effect on the economic position of public
organizations. An explanation for this could be that working in the public sector
might generally require more skilled labor.
With respect to the influence of an open-minded management, there appears to be
no disparity between the private and public sector. In both cases, a favorable attitude
of the management team has a positive effect on the economic position. This effect
does not change in times of downsizing, for neither private nor public sector
organizations. For the timing of involving the works councils, the picture becomes
rather different. Whereas calling in the works council in an early phase has a positive
effect on the economic position of private firms, this very same aspect of
codetermination negatively influences the economic position of organizations in the
public sector. An explanation might be that the public sector can be regarded as a rather
safe working environment, where job security is not really threatened by any
competitive pressures from the outside world. In such circumstances, calling in works
councils at an early stage gives workers’ representatives the opportunity to meddle in
everything. Moreover, this effect does not change in times of downsizing.
For the private sector sub-sample, we found that putting the brake on
decision-making processes seems to reflect meticulous decision-making. Works
councils take their time to consult with the managers, in order to create a
favorable platform for new measures and policies. This has a positive impact on
the economic position in good times. Yet, looking at the public sector, delaying
decision-making processes affects the economic position adversely. Hence, this
does not seem to reflect a careful decision-making process, especially not in bad
times. This is more in line with our original conjecture that a delaying works council
does so out of selfish reasons. The positive effect of an open-minded works council
on firm performance in the private sector does not show up in the public sector,
neither in good times nor in bad times. Overall, it seems that the process of
codetermination in terms of timing of involvement and slowing down decision-
making has a different impact in private versus public sector organizations. Whether
this really is a matter of different views on what careful decision-making does imply,
needs to be analyzed further in future work.
Conclusion
In their seminal work on the economics of codetermination, Freeman and Lazear
(1995) argue that several participation rights may induce employees to cooperate
with management for the benefit of the entire firm, but they also point to the possible
downsides of employee representation as this may lead to all kinds of extra costs,
including rent-seeking behavior. Extending Freeman and Lazear (1995), Bryson
et al. (2006) argue that worker voice can only function effectively if encouraged by
managers. We build on these combined insights to formulate conjectures as to the
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effect of codetermination on economic performance, which we tested with a Dutch
dataset. In so doing, our study offers a number of contributions to the codetermination
literature. First, availability of data for the first time offered the opportunity to study the
effects of codetermination on firm performance in the Netherlands by means of
multivariate regression analyses. This adds insights from an understudied institutional
context. Second, because of the availability of specific variables in this Dutch dataset,
we could estimate a much more intricate model. We do not simply test whether the mere
presence of a works council has any impact on the economic position of an
establishment, but instead we can determine to what degree several codetermination
characteristics influence an organization’s performance. Third, the estimation results
allowed, albeit tentatively, to compare the functioning of works councils within the
private and public sector, respectively. Fourth and finally, we could zoom in on the role
that worker participation plays in times of downsizing, exploring differential effects in
bad vis-à-vis good times by incorporating interaction effects.
The overall conclusion from our probit analyses is that the way in which
management teams and works councils interact, and hence the way in which
codetermination is implemented, makes all the difference to the organization’s
economic position. First of all, the ‘British finding’ by Bryson et al. (2006) is
confirmed in the Dutch context: a positive attitude of managers toward the works
council is positively associated with performance, in both the private and the
public sector. Moreover, we find that when management of private enterprises
involves the works council in the decision-making processes at an early stage, this
also has a positive impact on the economic position. The role of the worker
representatives’ attitude is important as well. With regard to the private sector, we
find a large difference between their impact in bad vis-à-vis good times. In bad
times, an open-minded works council is negatively associated with the economic
position; in good times, in contrast, this association is positive. In addition, a
delaying council is beneficial in good times, probably because such a works
council pays attention to careful decision-making, but this characteristic harms the
organization in bad times.
Finally, when contrasting the significant results for the public sector with those
for the private sector, we can carefully infer that especially with respect to the timing
of involvement and slowing down of decision-making variables, the results differ
remarkably. Contrary to the private sector, works councils in the public sector that
are either involved early or that tend to slow down decision-making, have an adverse
effect on the organization’s economic position. This remarkable difference suggests
that, apparently, works councils in the private sector primarily focus on the firm’s
overall interest, whereas works councils in the public sector tend to be more oriented
toward selfish rent-seeking behavior.
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